

able to satisfy even its nutritional requirements autistically (to use Bleuler's term), is offered by the bird embryo with its food supply enclosed within the eggshell, maternal care being restricted to the provision of warmth. — I shall regard it as less a correction than an elaboration of the above scheme if it is required to include devices that enable the system living by the pleasure principle to withdraw from the stimuli of the real world. These devices simply correspond to 'repression', which treats inner unpleasurable stimuli as if they were external, projecting them into the outside world.

5. Just as a nation whose wealth is based on exploiting its natural resources sets aside a specific area, like Yellowstone Park, to be preserved in its wild state and spared from the changes brought about by civilization.

6. The superiority of the reality-ego over the pleasure-ego is aptly expressed in Bernard Shaw's words: 'To be able to choose the line of greatest advantage instead of yielding in the direction of least resistance.' (*Man and Superman: A Comedy and a Philosophy*.)

7. Cf. similar in O. Rank [*Der Künstler, Ansätze zu einer Sexualpsychologie*, Leipzig and Vienna] (1907).

## *Drives and Their Fates*

We have often heard the demand that a science be built on clear and precisely defined basic concepts. In reality, no science, not even the most exact, starts out with such definitions. The true beginnings of scientific activity consist, rather, in the description of phenomena, which are then grouped, classified, and brought into relation with each other. Even when simply describing the material, we cannot avoid applying to it certain abstract ideas, acquired from somewhere or other but certainly not just from the new observations alone. When this material is further elaborated, such ideas – later the basic concepts of the science – are even more indispensable. They must initially have a certain degree of indeterminacy about them; there can be no question of clearly demarcating their content. While they exist in this state, we reach a consensus about their meaning by repeated reference to the empirical material from which they appear to derive but which, in reality, is being subordinated to them. Strictly speaking, then, they are in the nature of conventions – although everything actually depends on their being not chosen arbitrarily, but determined by meaningful connections with the empirical material, connections that, ostensibly, we surmise before we can properly identify and substantiate them. Only after a more thorough investigation of the relevant empirical field can we formulate its basic scientific concepts more precisely, progressively revising them to widen their applicability while keeping them completely free of contradictions. Then the time may also have come to try and pin them down in definitions. But the advance of knowledge will brook no rigidity here. As the example of physics strikingly demonstrates, even those ‘basic concepts’ firmly

established in the form of definitions are constantly being substantially revised.

One such conventional, and at present still rather obscure, basic concept, which is none the less indispensable to us in psychology, is that of the *drive*. Let us try to flesh it out by considering it from a variety of angles.

First from the perspective of physiology. This has given us the concept of the *stimulus* and the model of the reflex, according to which a stimulus applied to living tissue (nerve substance) from the outside is discharged by action directed *towards* the outside. This action is appropriate in so far as it withdraws the stimulated substance from the influence of the stimulus, moving it out of reach of the stimulant effect.

So what is the relationship between 'drive' and 'stimulus'? There is nothing to prevent us from subsuming the concept of the drive under that of the stimulus: a drive, then, is a stimulus to the psyche. Straight away, though, we are mindful not simply to equate drive with psychic stimulus. Clearly there are other stimuli to the psyche than just drive stimuli – ones that behave much more like physiological stimuli. For example, when a strong light hits the eye, this is not a drive stimulus, but it is when we sense dryness in the mucous membrane of the throat, or irritation in the mucous membrane of the stomach.<sup>1</sup>

We now have the means to distinguish drive stimuli from other (physiological) stimuli acting on the psyche. First, a drive stimulus emanates not from the outside world, but from inside the organism itself. For this reason it affects the psyche differently and different actions are needed to remove it. Furthermore, we remain true to the essence of the stimulus if we assume it has the effect of a single impact; it can thus also be dealt with by a single expedient action, epitomized by motor flight from a source of stimulation. Of course, these impacts may be repeated and their effects may accumulate, but this does not alter our conception of the process of a stimulus or the conditions necessary for its removal. The effect of a drive, on the other hand, is never that of a *momentary* impact, but always that of a *constant* force. And because it impinges not from outside, but

from inside the body, flight is of no avail against it. It is better to call the drive stimulus a 'need'; what removes this need is '*satisfaction*'. This can be achieved only by making a sufficient (adequate) alteration to the internal source of stimulation.

Suppose we adopt the standpoint of an almost completely helpless organism, not yet orientated in the world, whose nerve substance is receiving stimuli. This organism is very soon in a position to make a first distinction and achieve an initial orientation. On the one hand, it will discern stimuli that it can evade by muscle action (flight), stimuli it will ascribe to an outside world; on the other hand, there will be stimuli against which such action has no effect, whose characteristic constant pressure persists regardless; these stimuli are signs of an inner world, evidence of drive needs. The perceptual substance of the organism will thus have found, in the effectiveness of its muscle activity, a foothold in distinguishing an 'outside' from an 'inside'.

Initially, then, we locate the essence of the drive in its main characteristics – its emanating from sources of stimulation inside the organism, its manifesting itself as a constant force – and from these we deduce another of its features, its imperviousness to flight actions. In the course of this discussion, however, we cannot help noticing something that prompts a further admission from us. To guide us in our elaboration of psychological phenomena, not only do we bring, in the form of basic concepts, certain conventions to our empirical material, we also make use of a variety of complex *assumptions*. We have already alluded to the most important of these, it just remains for us to draw explicit attention to it. This assumption is *biological* in nature and involves the concept of purpose (or, perhaps, expediency); it runs as follows: the nervous system is an apparatus dedicated to eliminating the stimuli that reach it, or to reducing them to the lowest possible level; or an apparatus that, if it were only feasible, would aim to remain free from stimulation altogether. So, without, for the moment, taking exception to the vagueness of this idea, let us ascribe to the nervous system the task, broadly speaking, of *mastering stimuli*. Now we can see how greatly the introduction of drives complicates the simple model of the physiological reflex. External stimuli set the organism a single task,

evasion; this is accomplished by muscle movements, one of which eventually achieves the aim and, being the most expedient, goes on to become an hereditary disposition. Drive stimuli, emanating from inside the organism, cannot be dealt with by this mechanism. They therefore make much greater demands on the nervous system, causing it to undertake intricate, convoluted activities that alter the outside world sufficiently for it to provide satisfaction to the inner source of stimulation; above all, they force the nervous system to renounce its ideal intention of avoiding stimuli because they supply a constant, inescapable flow of stimulation. Thus we may well conclude that it is not external stimuli, but the drives that are the real motive force behind the advances that have brought the nervous system, with its infinite capabilities, to its present height of development. Of course, there is nothing to prevent us from assuming that drives themselves are, at least in part, the precipitates of external stimuli, which over the course of phylogenesis have caused living tissue to modify.

If we now determine that the activity of even the most highly developed psychic apparatus is governed by the *pleasure principle*, i.e., regulated automatically by sensations on the pleasure–unpleasure scale, we can hardly avoid the further assumption that these sensations replicate the manner in which stimuli are dealt with – in the sense, no doubt, that an unpleasurable sensation involves an increase, a pleasurable sensation a decrease in stimulation. But we will be careful to preserve the extremely vague nature of this assumption until we can somehow manage to surmise the kinds of connection that exist between, on the one hand, pleasure and unpleasure and, on the other, fluctuations in the quantities of stimulation at work in the psyche. Such connections may well be very diverse and far from simple.

If we now turn to considering psychic life from the biological perspective, the ‘drive’ emerges as a concept on the borderline between the mental and the physical – the psychic representative of stimuli flowing into the psyche from inside the body, or the degree of workload imposed on the psyche as a result of its relation to the body.

\*

We can now discuss certain terms used in connection with the concept of the drive, such as its pressure, aim, object and source.

By the *pressure* of a drive we mean its motor element, the amount of force or the degree of workload it represents. Pressure is a general characteristic of the drives, indeed their very essence. Every drive involves activity; if we speak loosely of passive drives, this can mean only drives with a passive aim.

The *aim* of a drive is always satisfaction, which can be achieved only by removing the state of stimulation at the source of the drive. But even though this ultimate aim is invariable in every drive, a variety of means may lead to this same end, so that many different more or less intermediate aims may arise from a single drive, aims that can be combined and interchanged with one another. Experience also permits us to speak of ‘*aim-inhibited*’ drives, where processes are allowed to advance some way towards drive satisfaction but are then inhibited or diverted. We can assume that these processes, too, involve partial satisfaction.

The *object* of a drive is that upon which or through which the drive is able to achieve its aim. It is the most variable aspect of a drive, not originally connected with it, but merely appropriated by it on grounds of its suitability to provide satisfaction. It is not necessarily something external, it can just as well be a part of the subject’s own body. Over the course of a drive’s unfolding fate, it may be changed as often as required, and this capacity for displacement has crucial roles to play. The same object may serve to satisfy a variety of drives simultaneously, a case of *overlapping* drives, as Alfred Adler (1908) puts it. A particularly intimate attachment of a drive to an object is classed as a *fixation* of that drive. This often occurs in very early phases of the drive’s development, putting an end to the drive’s mutability by vigorously resisting detachment from the object.

By the *source* of a drive we mean that physical process, in an organ or part of the body, whose stimulus is represented in the psyche by the drive. It is not known if this process is always chemical in nature or if it may also correspond with the release of other – for example, mechanical – forces. The study of drive sources goes

beyond the scope of psychology; although a drive is wholly determined by its origin in a physical source, in psychic life it manifests itself only through its aims. More precise knowledge about drive sources is not strictly necessary for the purposes of psychological investigation. Sometimes we can confidently deduce the source of a drive from its aims.

Are we to assume that the various drives emanating from the body and acting on the psyche are also distinguished by various *qualities*, and thus behave in qualitatively different ways in psychic life? There does not appear to be any justification for this; rather the simpler assumption suffices – that the drives are all qualitatively alike and that it is the quantities of excitation they carry, perhaps also certain functions of this quantity, that alone are responsible for their effect. The differences in the psychic effects of individual drives can be traced back to their differing sources. It is, however, only in a later connection that we can explain the real significance of this question of drive qualities.

What drives, and how many, may we suppose exist? Clearly there is great scope here for arbitrariness. We cannot object to anyone resorting to the concept of a play drive, or a destruction drive, or a social drive, where the subject-matter calls for it and the limitations of psychological analysis permit. But we should not neglect to ask if such highly specialized drive motives cannot be further reduced to their sources, leaving only the irreducible primal drives to claim our interest.

I have proposed that we distinguish two groups of such primal drives, the *ego* or *self-preservation drives* and the *sexual drives*. This hypothesis does not, however, carry the weight of a necessary premise, unlike, for example, our assumption about the biological purpose of the psychic apparatus (see above); it is merely a kind of scaffolding, to be retained only as long as it proves useful and which can be replaced without greatly affecting the results of our work of description and classification. This hypothesis is a result of the historical evolution of psychoanalysis, which was initially applied to the psychoneuroses, specifically the group termed 'transference

neuroses' (hysteria and compulsion neurosis). Here we came to the conclusion that at the root of every such illness lay a conflict between the demands of sexuality and those of the ego. It is always possible that an in-depth study of the other neurotic conditions (especially the narcissistic psychoneuroses, the schizophrenic disorders) could force us to revise this formula and consequently our classification of the primal drives. For now, though, we do not know this new formula, nor have we met with any argument that undermines our opposition of ego and sexual drives.

It is highly doubtful that conclusive pointers for differentiating and classifying the drives can ever be obtained just from elaborating the psychological material. It seems, rather, that for the purposes of this elaboration we need to apply definite assumptions about the nature of the drives to the material, and it would be preferable if we could take these assumptions from another field, transferring them to psychology. What biology has to contribute here certainly does not run counter to our distinction between ego drives and sexual drives. Biology informs us that sexuality is distinct from the other functions of the individual because its purposes – the creation of new individuals, and thus the preservation of the species – transcend the individual. It also shows us that two equally valid ways of conceiving of the relationship between ego and sexuality exist side by side, one in which the individual is paramount, with sexuality regarded as one of its activities and sexual satisfaction as one of its needs, and another according to which the individual is a temporary and transient adjunct to the quasi-immortal germ plasm entrusted to it in the process of reproduction. The assumption that the sexual function is distinguished from other bodily processes by a special chemistry is also, as I understand it, a premise of the Ehrlich school of biology.

As any study of the drives from the perspective of consciousness presents almost insurmountable difficulties, psychoanalytical research into psychic disorders remains the primary source of our knowledge. Due to the way it has evolved, though, psychoanalysis has so far been able to provide reasonably satisfactory information about only the sexual drives, having been able to observe only this

particular group in isolation, as it were, in the psychoneuroses. No doubt the extension of psychoanalysis to the other neurotic conditions will provide us with the basis for a knowledge of the ego drives, although it seems presumptuous to expect similarly favourable conditions for observation in this new field of research.

To characterize the sexual drives in general, we can say the following: they are many in number, they emanate from a great variety of organic sources, and initially they act independently of each other, achieving a more or less complete synthesis only at a late stage. The aim each one strives to attain is *organ pleasure*; only on completing synthesis do they enter the service of the *reproductive function*, at which point they become generally recognizable as sexual drives. Initially, they are dependent on self-preservation drives and become detached from these only gradually; when finding an object, they also follow the paths laid down by the ego drives. A proportion of them remain attached to the ego drives throughout life, providing these with *libidinal* components, which are easily overlooked during normal functioning and manifest themselves only in illness. They have an extraordinary capacity to stand in vicariously for one another and to change their objects with ease. Due to these latter qualities, they are capable of feats far removed from their original functions. (*Sublimation.*)

Our investigation into the various fates experienced by drives over the course of their development and subsequent existence will have to be restricted to the better-known sexual drives. From our observations we know of the following such fates:

- Reversal into the opposite.
- Turning back on the self.
- Repression.
- Sublimation.

As I do not intend to deal with sublimation here, and repression requires a chapter of its own, it just remains for us to describe and discuss the first two items. In view of the forces at work to prevent drives from pursuing their direct course, we can also regard these fates as forms of *defence* against the drives.

On closer inspection, *reversal into the opposite* can be broken

down into two different processes, *turning activity into passivity* and *reversal of content*. The two processes, being different in nature, must also be dealt with separately.

Examples of the first process are provided by the pairs of opposites sadism-masochism and voyeurism-exhibitionism. The reversal involves only the *aims* of the drive; the active aim (to hurt, to look at) is replaced by the passive aim (to be hurt, to be looked at). Reversal of content is found only in the case of the transformation of love into hate.

*Turning back on the self* is evident when we consider that masochism is really a form of sadism turned against the subject's own ego, or that exhibitionism includes looking at one's own body. Analytical observation leaves us in no doubt that the masochist does indeed share pleasure in the violence against himself, and that the exhibitionist shares pleasure in the act of exposure. The essence of the process, then, is the change of *object*, the aim remaining unchanged.

It cannot have escaped our notice that turning back on the self and turning activity into passivity correspond or coincide in these examples. To clarify these relations a more thorough investigation is necessary.

For the pair of opposites sadism-masochism we can represent the process as follows:

a) Sadism consists in exercising violence towards or power over another person, the object.

b) This object is relinquished and replaced by the subject's own person. With this turning back on the self, the active aim of the drive is transformed into a passive one.

c) Another person is once again sought as an object who, because the drive aim has been transformed, must now adopt the role of the subject.

Case *c* is that commonly known as masochism. Here, too, the satisfaction occurs along the path of the original sadism, the passive ego fantasizing itself back into its previous role, now ceded to the other subject. It is highly unlikely that a more direct form of masochistic satisfaction exists. A primary masochism - one that does


not stem from sadism in the way described above – does not appear to occur.<sup>2</sup> That the postulation of stage *b* is not superfluous is clear from the behaviour of the sadistic drive in compulsion neurosis. Here we find turning back on the self but without passivity towards another person. The transformation proceeds only as far as stage *b*. The desire for cruelty turns into self-torment and self-punishment, not masochism. The active verb becomes not a passive, but a reflexive.

Our view of sadism is further complicated by the fact that, alongside (or perhaps, rather, within) its general aim, this drive seems to strive for a quite special aim. As well as to humiliate and dominate, it seeks to inflict pain. Psychoanalysis, however, seems to show that inflicting pain plays no part in the drive's original aims. The sadistic child pays no heed to whether it inflicts pain or not and never intends to do so. Once the transformation into masochism has taken place, however, pain is very well suited to becoming a passive masochistic aim, for we have every reason to believe that sensations of pain can – like other sensations of unpleasure – shade over into sexual arousal and produce a pleasurable state, for the sake of which even the unpleasure of pain can be willingly undergone. Once feeling pain has become a masochistic aim, the sadistic aim of inflicting pain can also arise retroactively, for this pain, while being caused to another person, is enjoyed masochistically in identification with the suffering object. In both cases, of course, it is not the pain itself that is enjoyed, but the accompanying sexual arousal, which is especially convenient for the sadist. This would make the enjoyment of pain a primary masochistic aim, but one which can become a drive aim only in someone who was originally sadistic.

For the sake of completeness, I should add that *compassion* cannot be described as the result of a transformation of the sadistic drive, but involves instead the notion of a *reaction formation* against the drive (for the difference, see later).

The study of another pair of opposites, the drives whose aims are looking and displaying oneself (voyeurism and exhibitionism, in the language of the perversions), yields somewhat different and simpler results. Here, too, we can postulate the same stages as in the previous

case: *a*) looking as an *activity* directed towards another object; *b*) relinquishing the object, turning the voyeuristic drive towards a part of one's own body and, with this, reversal into passivity and the setting up of a new aim – to be looked at; *c*) the introduction of a new subject to whom one displays oneself in order to be looked at. Again we can hardly doubt that the active aim occurs before the passive one, that looking precedes being looked at. There is, however, a significant deviation from the paradigm of sadism in that we can detect in the voyeuristic drive an even earlier stage than that designated *a*. In its initial activity the voyeuristic drive is auto-erotic – it does have an object, but one found on the subject's own body. Only later does it come (by way of comparison) to exchange this object for an analogous one on the body of another (stage *a*). This preliminary stage is interesting because the situations of each of the resulting pair of opposites arise from it, depending on which element is transformed. A diagram for the voyeuristic drive might look as follows:



A preliminary stage of this kind is not present in sadism, which from the outset is directed towards an external object, although it would not exactly be absurd to construct such a stage from the child's efforts to gain mastery over its own limbs.<sup>3</sup>

It is true of both kinds of drive under consideration here that transformations by reversal of activity into passivity and turning back on the self never actually involve the whole amount of the drive impulse. To some extent, the older, active tendency continues to exist alongside the later, passive one, even when the transformation has been very extensive. The only accurate statement we could make about the voyeuristic drive is that all its developmental stages – the preliminary auto-erotic stage as well as its final active and passive forms – coexist alongside each other, which becomes evident when

we take as our basis not the actions prompted by the drive, but the mechanism of satisfaction. Perhaps we might permit ourselves to consider and depict these circumstances in yet another way. We can divide the life of each drive up into individual waves – temporally distinct and uniform within any given period – which behave in relation to each other somewhat like successive eruptions of lava. We might then imagine, say, the first, original eruption of the drive continuing in an unchanged form, undergoing no development of any kind. A subsequent wave may then, from the outset, undergo some change – reversal into passivity, say – and would then add itself, with this new characteristic, to the previous one, and so on. If we were then to survey the drive impulse from its beginning up to a given point, this succession of waves would offer us an image of the specific development of that drive.

The fact that, in this later period of development, a drive impulse can be observed alongside its (passive) opposite merits its own special term, for which Bleuler's *ambivalence* is ideal.

These considerations of the genesis of drives and the permanence of their intermediate stages provide us with some understanding of the way drives have developed. Experience shows that the degree of demonstrable ambivalence varies greatly between individuals, groups and races. A marked drive ambivalence in someone alive today may be regarded as an archaic inheritance, because we have reason to believe that untransformed, active drive impulses generally played a greater role in primeval times than today.

We have taken to calling the early phase of the ego's development, during which the sexual drives find satisfaction auto-erotically, *narcissism* (avoiding, at first, any discussion about the relationship between auto-eroticism and narcissism). This would mean the preliminary stage of the voyeuristic drive, in which the object of the desire to look is the subject's own body, would have to be classed under narcissism, as a narcissistic formation. The active voyeuristic drive would then evolve from this by leaving narcissism behind, whereas passive voyeurism would retain the narcissistic object. Similarly, the transformation of sadism into masochism would involve a reversion to the narcissistic object, in both cases the narcissistic

subject being replaced, via identification, by another, external ego. Taking our construction of a preliminary narcissistic stage of sadism into account, we approach the more general conclusion that these two drive fates – turning back on the self and reversal of activity into passivity – are dependent on the narcissistic organization of the ego and bear the imprint of this phase. Perhaps they represent attempts at defence that at higher levels of ego development are conducted by other means.

Let us remind ourselves at this point that we have so far discussed only two pairs of drive opposites: sadism–masochism and voyeurism–exhibitionism. These are the best-known sexual drives that occur ambivalently. The other components of what is later to become the sexual function are not yet sufficiently accessible to analysis for us to be able to discuss them in a similar way. We can say of them in general that their activity is *auto-erotic*, i.e., their object is insignificant in comparison with the organ that is their source, and as a rule the two coincide. The object of the voyeuristic drive, although initially also a part of the subject's own body, is not however the eye itself, and the organ at the source of sadism – probably the system of muscles capable of action – points directly towards another object, even if this is part of the subject's own body. The organ at its source is so crucial to an auto-erotic drive that, according to an appealing hypothesis proposed by P. Federn (1913) and L. Jekels (1913), the form and function of the organ determine the activity or passivity of the drive aim.

The reversal of a drive's content into its opposite can be observed in just one case, the *transformation of love into hate*. These two are so commonly directed towards the same object simultaneously that this coexistence also provides us with the most significant example of emotional ambivalence.

The case of love and hate is particularly interesting in that it resists being assimilated into our account of the drives. We cannot doubt that the most intimate relationship exists between these two emotional opposites and sexuality, but we naturally reject the notion that love is some specific component drive of sexuality like any other. We would prefer to view love as the expression of the sexual urge as

a whole, but this is also insufficient, and we are not sure how we are to understand the opposite of this urge.

Love has not just one, but three opposites. Apart from the opposition of loving-hating, there is another of loving-being loved and, in addition, loving and hating taken together stand in opposition to indifference. The second of these three oppositions, that of loving-being loved, corresponds exactly with the transformation of activity into passivity and can, like the voyeuristic drive, also be traced back to a primal situation. This is *loving oneself*, which for us is the characteristic feature of narcissism. Depending on whether the object or the subject is then exchanged for an external one, there results the active aim of loving or the passive aim of being loved, the latter remaining close to narcissism.

We can perhaps better understand the various opposites of love by reflecting that our psychic life as a whole is governed by *three polarities*, the oppositions of:

- *subject (ego)-object (outside world)*
- *pleasure-unpleasure*
- *active-passive.*

As we have already said, the opposition of ego-non-ego (outside), or subject-object, impresses itself on the individual organism at an early stage, when it learns that it can silence external stimuli by its muscle actions but is defenceless against drive stimuli. It is an opposition that, above all, governs intellectual activity, creating the basic condition of scientific investigation that no amount of effort can alter. The polarity of pleasure-unpleasure is based on a scale of sensations whose supremely significant role in deciding our actions (will) has already been stressed. The opposition of active-passive is not to be confused with that of ego-subject-outside-object. The ego behaves passively towards the outside world in so far as it receives stimuli from it, but actively when it reacts to these. It is forced into especial *activity* towards the outside world by its drives, so we could, in emphasizing what is essential, say the ego-subject is passive towards external stimuli, but active through its own drives. The opposition active-passive later converges with that of masculine-feminine, which has no psychological significance prior to this. The

fusion of activity with masculinity and passivity with femininity presents itself to us as nothing less than a biological fact; it is, however, by no means as invariably comprehensive or exclusive as we tend to assume.

The three psychic polarities are interconnected in crucial ways. There is one primal psychic situation in which two of them coincide. Originally, at the very beginning of psychic life, the ego finds itself invested with drives that it is able, in part, to satisfy by itself. We call this state narcissism and this means of satisfaction auto-erotic.<sup>4</sup> The outside world at this time is not invested with interest (in the general sense) and remains a matter of indifference as far as satisfaction is concerned. At this time, then, the ego-subject coincides with what is pleasurable, the outside world with what is indifferent (or possibly, as a source of stimulation, with what is unpleasurable). If we initially define love as the ego's relation to its sources of pleasure, the situation in which the ego loves only itself, and is indifferent to the world, accounts for the first opposition in which love occurs.

In so far as it is auto-erotic, the ego does not need the outside world, but, as a result of experiences undergone by the self-preservation drives, it does acquire objects from it, and of course it cannot help perceiving inner drive stimuli as temporarily unpleasurable. So under the rule of the pleasure principle another development now takes place. The ego takes the objects it encounters, in so far as they are sources of pleasure, into itself, it introjects them (to use Ferenczi's term), while, on the other hand, expelling whatever within itself causes unpleasure. (See later, the mechanism of projection.)

The original reality-ego, which distinguished an inside from an outside by means of a sound objective criterion, thus turns into a purified *pleasure-ego*, which puts the factor of pleasure above all else. The outside world is divided up into a pleasurable part, which it incorporates into itself, and the rest, which is alien to it. It also separates off a part of its own self, which it projects into the outside world and perceives as hostile. After this rearrangement, the congruence is restored between the two polarities:

- ego-subject and pleasure

– outside world and unpleasure (previously indifference).

When objects appear during the stage of primary narcissism, the second opposite of love develops as well, namely hate.

As we have heard, the ego is first introduced to objects from the outside world by the self-preservation drives, and we have to accept that hate originally denoted the ego's relation to the alien outside world and its stimuli. After having first appeared as their forerunner, indifference must now be classed as a special case of hate or aversion. In the very beginning, the outside world, objects, and what is hated are identical. If an object subsequently proves to be a source of pleasure, it is loved, but it is also incorporated into the ego, so, for the purified pleasure-ego, the object and what is alien and hated are once again one and the same.

Now, however, we note that, just as the opposition of love–indifference mirrors the polarity of ego–outside world, so the second opposition of love–hate reflects the related polarity of pleasure–unpleasure. When the purely narcissistic stage has been superseded by the object stage, pleasure and unpleasure denote the ego's relations to objects. If an object is a source of pleasurable sensations, there arises a motor impulse to bring it closer to and incorporate it into the ego; we then speak of the 'attraction' of the pleasure-giving object and say we 'love' the object. Conversely, if the object is a source of unpleasurable sensations, there is an impulse to increase the distance between it and the ego, repeating the original attempt at flight from the stimuli of the outside world. We feel 'repulsion' at such an object and hate it; this hate can then escalate into an aggressive inclination towards the object, an intent to destroy it.

We could, at a stretch, say that a drive 'loves' the object that it strives towards in search of satisfaction. But to say a drive 'hates' an object sounds strange to us, so we see the terms love and hate do not apply to the relations between drives and their objects and should be reserved for the relation of the ego as a whole to its objects. However, considerations of linguistic usage, which are no doubt significant, reveal a further limitation to the meaning of love and hate. We do not say that we love the objects that serve self-preservation, rather we emphasize the fact that we need them,

perhaps expanding on this by using words that indicate a highly subdued form of love, such as liking, being fond of, finding pleasant.

The word 'love', then, shifts ever more into the sphere of the ego's pure relation of pleasure to the object, finally affixing itself to sexual objects in the narrower sense, as well as to those objects satisfying the needs of sublimated sexual drives. The distinction between ego and sexual drives that we have imposed on our psychology thus proves to be in keeping with the spirit of our language. If we do not normally say a particular sexual drive loves its object, and if the most appropriate use of the word 'love' is, rather, to describe the ego's relation to its sexual object, this tells us that the word is applicable here only after the synthesis of all the component sexual drives under the primacy of the genitals in the service of the reproductive function.

It is worth noting that no such intimate connection with sexual pleasure and the sexual function is evident in our use of the word 'hate'; the relation of unpleasure seems, rather, to be the sole decisive factor. The ego hates, is repelled by, pursues with destructive intent any object that becomes a source of unpleasurable sensations, regardless of whether it is frustrating sexual satisfaction or the satisfaction of self-preservation needs. Indeed, we can say that the true prototypes of the hate relation stem not from sexual life, but from the ego's struggle to preserve and assert itself.

Love and hate, then, which present themselves to us as complete opposites, stand in no such simple relation to each other after all. They have not originated from the splitting up of some primal common entity, but have different sources and have undergone separate developments before being constituted as opposites under the influence of pleasure–unpleasure relations. We are now left with the task of summarizing what we know about the genesis of love and hate.

Love stems from the ego's capacity to satisfy some of its drive impulses auto-erotically, by the attainment of organ pleasure. It is originally narcissistic, then it spreads to those objects incorporated into the extended ego, expressing the ego's motor impulse towards these objects as sources of pleasure. It becomes intimately related

to the activity of the later sexual drives and, when their synthesis is complete, corresponds to the sexual urge as a whole. The preliminary stages of love manifest themselves as provisional sexual aims while the sexual drives undergo their complex development. We know the first of these aims to be *incorporating* or *devouring*, a form of love compatible with putting an end to the object's existence as a separate entity, one which can therefore be described as ambivalent. At the higher stage of pregenital sadistic-anal organization, desire for the object manifests itself in the form of an urge to overpower it, regardless of whether this causes injury or destruction to the object. In its treatment of the object, then, this form and preliminary stage of love is scarcely distinguishable from hate. Only after the establishment of the genital organization does love become the opposite of hate.

As an object relation, hate is older than love, its source being the narcissistic ego's primal rejection of the stimuli of the outside world. As an expression of the reaction of unpleasure provoked by objects, it remains forever closely related to the self-preservation drives, so that ego drives and sexual drives readily form an opposition replicating that between hate and love. When the ego drives dominate the sexual function, as at the stage of sadistic-anal organization, they also lend the characteristics of hate to the drive aims.

The history of love's origins and relations explains why it so often occurs in 'ambivalent' form, i.e., accompanied by impulses of hate towards the same object. The admixture of hate in love derives in part from the preliminary stages of love that have not been fully surmounted, the rest being based on reactions of rejection by the ego drives, which, in view of the frequent conflicts between self-interest and love interests, can adduce real and present motives. In both cases, then, the admixture of hate can be traced back to a source in the self-preservation drives. When a love relation towards a particular object is broken off, hate not infrequently takes its place, giving us the impression that love has turned into hate. We go one better than this description with our view that the presently motivated hate is here being bolstered by the regression of love to the preliminary sadistic stage, providing the hate with an erotic character and ensuring the continuation of a love relation.

The third opposition involving love, the transformation of loving into being loved, corresponds to the influence of the polarity of activity and passivity and can be viewed in the same way as the cases of voyeurism and sadism.

We may conclude by pointing out that the drive fates consist essentially in *drive impulses being subjected to the influence of the three great polarities governing psychic life*. Of these three polarities, that of activity-passivity could be described as the *biological* polarity, that of ego-outside world as the *real* polarity, and finally that of pleasure-unpleasure as the *economic* polarity.

The drive fate of *repression* will be the subject of the following study.

(1915)

### Notes

1. Assuming these internal processes are indeed the organic basis of the needs of thirst and hunger respectively.
2. In connection with problems regarding the life of the drives, I have in later works (see 'The Economic Problem of Masochism', 1924) expressed the opposite view.
3. See previous note.
4. Certain of the sexual drives are, as we know, capable of this auto-erotic satisfaction and are therefore suitable vehicles of the development governed by the pleasure principle to be described presently. Of course, those sexual drives requiring an object from the outset and those needs based on ego drives, which can never be satisfied auto-erotically, disrupt the primal narcissistic state, paving the way for progress. Indeed, this state could not even undergo that development at all were it not for the fact that each individual organism passes through a period of *helplessness* and *nurture*, during which its urgent needs are satisfied by an outside agency and are thus withdrawn from the process of development.

